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CHAPTER 10 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER* 
§ 10.1. Rate of Development and Youth Lot Exemption By-Laws Up-
held. Concern with implementing controls on community growth has risen 
significantly over the past two decades. 1 During the 1980 Survey year, in 
Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a 
municipality has the authority, within limitations, to enact a rate of 
development by-law and that such a by-law is constitutional. 3 The Sturges 
Court also denied a challenge to another by-law, the "youth exception by-
law" which creates an exception to the town's minimum lot size re-
quirements for younger residents of the town. 4 Finally, the Court deter-
mined whether the subdivision control law applied to the plaintiffs' 
unregistered land' and how the term "adjoining" in G.L. c. 40A, § 66 
should be applied to two of the plaintiffs' lots. 7 
The plaintiffs in Sturges were joint owners of several parcels of land in 
the small, rural town of Chilmark on Martha's Vineyard. 8 They initiated an 
action in the land court in 1977, seeking determinations regarding several 
by-laws and regulatory provisions that could have been applied to restrict 
* RICHARD G. HUBER is Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The 
author gratefully and respectfully acknowledges the research and writing assistance provided 
by Patrick O'Malley and Paula Mahoney in the preparation of this chapter. 
§ 10.1. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING,§ 10.01; 3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN 
LAND PLANNING LAW, § 73.01. 
z 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 815, 402 N.E.2d 1346. 
' /d. at 821, 402 N.E.2d at 1350 . 
• /d. 
' /d. at 818, 402 N.E.2d at 1349. 
• /d. at 829, 402 N.E.2d at 1355. This section provides, in part, that: 
"[a]ny increase in area, frontage, width, yard, or depth requirements of a zoning or-
dinance or by-law shall not apply to a lot for single and two-family residential use which 
at the time of recording or endorsement, whichever occurs sooner was not held in com-
mon ownership with any adjoining land, conformed to then existing requirements and 
had less than the proposed requirement but at least five thousand square feet of area 
and fifty feet of frontage." 
G.L. c. 40A, § 6. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 829-30, 402 N.E.2d at 1355. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 815, 402 N.E.2d at 1347. 
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the plaintiffs' right to use their land.' On cross-appeals to the Supreme 
Judicial Court, the plaintiffs and the town challenged various rulings of the 
bmd court. The plaintiffs challenged the land court's determination that the 
plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the youth lot exception by-law and 
the land court's resultant refusal to determine the by-law's validity. The 
plaintiffs also challenged the court's ruling that their land was subject to the 
town's subdivision control law, despite subdivision of the land on recorded 
plans predating the subdivision control law. 10 The town appealed from the 
court's ruling that the rate of development by-law was unconstitutional and 
from the court's interpretation of the word "adjoining" in chapter 40A sec-
tion 6 of the General Laws to exclude the plaintiffs' lots joined only at one 
point. 11 Because each of the challenged rulings presents a distinct issue, they 
will be discussed separately. 
Rate of development by-law. The rate of development amendment to the 
town's zoning by-laws was enacted at a special town meeting in 1976. 12 The 
amendment restricted the number of building permits that could be issued 
for residential construction in any year. In the year of the subdivision, the 
amendment permitted construction permits to be issued for one-tenth of the 
subdivision. In each of the following nine years, an additional one-tenth 
could be issued. 13 The plaintiffs challenged authority of the town to adopt 
the by-law and claimed that the by-law was unconstitutional. 14 
The Court noted that, although time-based controls on local development 
have been a frequent source of litigation and a subject of controversy in 
other jurisdictions, the issue has not often been raised in Massachusetts. 15 
The Court did find precedent in a previous Massachusetts case, Collura v. 
Arlington, 16 in which a two-year moratorium on the construction of apart-
ment houses in certain areas was held to be an authorized form of interim 
zoning to prevent uncontrolled growth. 17 The Collura case was very limited 
in its scope because the by-law had a two-year time limit and applied only to 
apartment houses. 11 Because of this limited scope and because Collura did 
not raise of constitutional issue, the Sturges Court found Collura to be of 
little precedential value. u 
• ld. 
10 Id. at 816, 402 N.E.2d at 1347. 
II Id. 
12 ld. at 818, 402 N.E.2d at 1349. 
" ld. at 819, 402 N.E.2d at 1349. 
14 ld. 
" ld. at 820-21, 402 N.E.2d at 1350. 
16 367 Mass. 881, 329 N.E.2d 733 (1975). See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 197S ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW, § 19.2, at 519-24. 
17 376 Mass. at 887, 329 N.E.2d at 737. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 821, 402 N.E.2d at 1350. 
"ld. 
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Finding no precedent in its previous decisions, the Court announced that 
a Massachusetts city or town has the authority to adopt zoning measures 
which control orderly growth. 20 The Court further specified that such 
measures could include "reasonable time limitations on development, at 
least where these restrictions are temporary and adopted to provide con-
trolled development while the municipality engages in comprehensive plan-
ning studies. " 21 The Court found support for this ruling in the general pur-
poses of the Zoning Act. 22 The purpose of the Zoning Act, according to the 
Court, was to permit municipalities to enact any constitutionally permis-
sible zoning provisions, within limitations stated expressly in the Act. 23 
After holding that the town had the authority to enact the by-law, the 
Court turned to an examination of the by-law's constitutionality. Because 
the issue was one of first impression in Massachusetts, the Court noted 
cases from other jurisdictions in which time-based controls have been 
upheld against constitutional challenges. 24 The prominent cases upholding 
these controls were Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County 
v. Petaluma2' and Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo. 26 The Sturges 
Court observed that these cases dealing with time restraints on residential 
development generally have involved suburban communities affected by the 
expansion of a metropolitan area, in marked contrast to the town of 
Chilmark. Chilmark, as a town of 400 residents, is isolated on the island of 
Martha's Vineyard. 27 While acknowledging that the constitutional prin-
ciples remain constant, the Court determined that some differences in ap-
20 /d. 
21 !d. 
22 St. 1975, c. 808, § 2A. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 821, 402 N.E.2d at 1350-51. Municipalities are permitted 
specifically to use zoning by-laws to control population density, the water supply, the conser-
vation of natural resources, and pollution. /d. 
" /d. at 822, 402 N.E.2d at 1351. 
" 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). In response to the rapid 
growth in the San Franciso Bay in the early 1960's, which showed a projected 1985 population 
of 77,000 for the suburb of Petaluma, Petaluma adopted a plan to limit its overall growth. This 
plan included a five-year quota on the number of residential units that could be constructed in 
subdivisions above a certain size in any year. 522 F.2d at 900-0l. The plan was upheld by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit against a challenge that the plan was arbitrary and 
unreasonable and, therefore, in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. /d. at 905-09. 
26 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 
(1972). In Golden, the town of Ramapo, a suburb of New York City, adopted a zoning amend-
ment which keyed subdivision development to the scheduled expansion of municipal facilities 
and services. The developer could accelerate the rate at which subdivisions could be developed 
by installing some of the municipal services himself. !d. at 366-69, 285 N.E.2d at 294-96, 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 142-44. In upholding the scheme, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished 
between a total prohibition of development, and timed growth control measures, which are 
legitimate zoning devices. !d. at 373, 285 N.E.2d at 298-99, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 147-48. 
27 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 823, 402 N.E.2d at 1351. 
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proach were warranted because of the nature of the municipality. 28 For ex-
ample, considerations regarding regional housing requirements and the 
potential exclusionary impact of a municipality's action are significantly 
lessened in a rural area. 29 When the demand is only for vacation homes for 
wealthy nonresidents rather than for primary housing to meet regional 
needs, 30 the Court observed that local concern with preserving the environ-
ment and a way of life should be given greater weight. 31 Support for this 
distinction was found in Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Sanbornton, 32 in 
which a six acre minimum lot provision was upheld in a rural New Hamp-
shire town. 33 The Sturges Court pointed out, however, that the Sanbornton 
court upheld the restrictive provision for only a limited time period. 34 The 
Court also looked to the "unique and perishable qualities" of Martha's 
Vineyard, which were already the subject of special protection by a statute 
enforced by the Martha's Vineyard Commission. 35 The Court concluded 
that the town's by-law was responding not merely to local considerations 
but also to the regional concerns expressed by statute. 36 
The Court also emphasized the limitation of its own role in reviewing the 
validity of zoning acts. 37 The Court quoted the test established by the 
United States Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 31 that a by-
law is unconstitutional only if it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, hav-
ing no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.'' 39 Furthermore, the Sturges Court emphasized that "any possible 
permissible legislative goal which may rationally be furthered by the regula-
tion" will support its constitutionality against a due process challenge. 40 
The Court observed, however, that the town must "bring forward some in-
dication that the zoning provision has some reasonable prospect of a tan-
gible benefit to the community" and make a showing "on the record" of a 
reasonable basis for the by-law. 41 
The Court found such justification for the by-law in the record, noting 
that the town had conferred with the Martha's Vineyard Commission and 
" Id., 402 N.E.2d at 1351-52. 
29 Id., 402.N.E.2d at 1352. 
•• Id. 
" Id. 
" 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). 
" Id. at ~1. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 824, 402 N.E.2d at 1352 (citing Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Sanborn-
ton, 469 F.2d at 962). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 824, 402 N.E.2d at 1352. 
" Id. at 824-25, 402 N.E.2d at 1352. 
" Id. at 825, 402 N.E.2d at 1352. 
" 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 825, 402 N.E.2d at 1352, (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 u.s. 365, 395 (1926)). 
•• Id. 
•• Id. at 826, 402 N.E.2d at 1353. 
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had produced a number of studies, including development guidelines 
established by the Commission and federal maps of the area showing soil 
limitations for septic tank sewage disposal. 42 The Court determined that 
these studies provided a reasonable basis for the town's action, even though 
the studies were not admitted in evidence. 43 Testimony had shown, 
however, that, based on the studies, "reasonable people" had become con-
cerned about Chilmark's subsoil conditions,.4 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the land court judge's conclusion 
that he needed expert testimony regarding actual subsoil conditions in order 
to uphold the by-law. 45 The Supreme Judicial Court stated that this would 
have improperly placed on the town the burden of proof or the burden of 
coming forward with evidence. The town's proper burden was only to make 
a prima facie showing of a rational basis for its action. 46 
The Court concluded that the "need for time for study" provided such a 
basis, particularly since Chilmark was a town with a limited population, 
restricted annual budget and land area, and only five paved public ways. 47 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the by-law itself placed only a "partial 
and annually relaxing restriction on the construction of what will for the 
most part be second, or vacation, homes. " 48 The Court expressly avoided 
stating any opinion as to the by-law's application beyond the years im-
mediately following its adoption, and especially beyond the first ten-year 
period, preferring to assume that ten years was a reasonably necessary time 
for study and that the town would proceed in good faith in carrying out 
these measures. 49 
In its holding on this issue, the Court seems to emphasize the goal of 
preserving the status quo while consideration of an overall plan is under-
taken, a purpose often attributed to "interim" or "stop-gap" zoning. 50 
While the variety of types of cases dealing with time-based restrictions are 
frequently cited together, perhaps because they all have potential exclu-
sionary impact, it seems that this type of zoning to produce a temporary 
"holding pattern" for study differs substantially from the zoning schemes 
in Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. Petaluma' 1 and 
Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo. 52 In those cases, time-related restric-
•• Id. at 827, 402 N.E.2d at 1353 . 
•• /d . 
•• /d. 
•• ld., 402 N.E.2d at 1354. 
•• Id. 
4
' /d. at 828, 402 N.E.2d at 1354 . 
•• /d. 
•• Id. at 828-29, 402 N.E.2d at 1354-55. 
'
0 2 E. YoKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcriCE (4th ed. 1979), § 10-1. 
" 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See note 25 supra. 
" 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d :!!11, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed; 409 U.S. 1003 
(1972). See note 26 supra. 
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tions were an integral part of the comprehensive plan, implemented as a 
result of considered study. It is difficult to predict, therefore, how receptive 
the courts would be to a plan that was comprehensive and long-range and 
could not be interpreted as primarily providing ''time for study,'' as was the 
case in Sturges and in the decision in Collura v. Arlington. 53 
In addition, although the Court has clearly given its approval to restric-
tions on rate of development as a means of.promoting orderly growth, the 
application of this principle in the instant case was strongly influenced by 
and limited to the unique circumstances of the town of Chilmark. Since the 
Court indicated that the exclusionary impact was to be more heavily 
weighted in a suburban area where regional primary housing needs were 
likely to be affected, 54 a time-based scheme in such an area is likely to 
receive closer scrutiny. Indeed, the Massachusetts legislature has already 
mandated such special consideration in the case of low and moderate in-
come housing with the adoption of the Anti-Snob Zoning Law." 
Youth lot by-law. The plaintiffs in Sturges also challenged a second 
amendment enacted at the special town meeting in 1976.56 Termed the 
"youth lot by-law," it created an exceptionn to the town's three-acre 
minimum lot size requirement by authorizing the board of appeals to grant 
special permits to build single-family dwellings, primarily for owner-
occupancy, to applicants under 30 years of age who have been residents of 
Chilmark for eight consecutive years. 57 The town's express reason for 
adopting the measure was "[f]or the purpose of helping young people who 
have grown up in Chilmark and lived here for a substantial portion of their 
lives and who, because of the rising land prices, have been unable to obtain 
suitable homes at a reasonable price, and who desire to continue to live in 
Chilmark."" The trial judge had concluded that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to challenge the by-law, since they were benefited rather than harmed by 
it, and therefore declined to pass on its validity. 59 The plaintiffs in turn 
argued that they should be entitled to sell all their undersized lots affected 
by the by-law "without regard to the age, residence or economic condition 
of the purchaser. " 60 
The Supreme Judicial Court determined that because the plaintiffs 
asserted a right to sell their undersized lots without regard to age and 
residency and objected to these requirements as a restriction on that right, 
" 367 Mass. 881, 329 N.E.2d 733 (1975). See text and notes at notes 16-17, supra. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 823, 402 N.E.2d 1352. 
" G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1969 ANN. SuRv. MASs. LAW,§ 
14.1. 
,. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 816, 402 N.E.2d at 1348. 
" ld. at 816-17, 402 N.E.2d at 1348. 
" ld. at 816, 402 N.E.2d at 1348. 
" Id. at 817, 402 N.E.2d at 1348. 
•• Id. 
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they had standing to challenge the by-law." The Court determined that, as 
landowners, the plaintiffs had a statutory right "to petition for a decision 
concerning the validity or invalidity of any zoning restriction applicable to 
his land."62 
· Having established the plaintiffs' standing, the Court addressed the 
validity of the by-law. The Court construed the plaintiffs' challenge to be 
based upon their erroneous assumption that, if the supposedly invalid age 
and residency requirements were stricken, the remainder of the by-law 
would stand, thereby making special permits generally obtainable for 
uudersized lots. 63 The Court concluded that the town would never have 
enacted the by-law without these provisions, given its express purpose. 64 
The plaintiffs could not, therefore, affirmatively rely on the by-law with 
these allegedly invalid conditions taken out." The Court declared that the 
plaintiffs were bound by the terms of the youth lot by-law in selling any of 
their undersized lots for residential purposes. 66 The Court left it to the trial 
judge's discretion, however, to allow the plaintiffs to amend their com-
plaint to seek declaratory relief concerning the youth lot by-law in other 
respects. 67 
Although the challenge to the youth lot by-law was unsuccessful, the 
Court disposed of it on very narrow grounds. This by-law creates an in-
teresting and unusual classification that could be subject to other attacks. 
Rather than imposing an additional restriction on the use of the land, as is 
the case with most zoning legislation, this by-law selectively relaxes restric-
tions that are part of the overall zoning scheme of the town. Furthermore, it 
does so only for a specifically defined population, placing emphasis on 
ownership rather than use, which is a generally impermissible classification 
in zoning regulations. 
While in the instant case, the classification was challenged by landowners 
who sought to extend this relaxation of restrictions to all their undersized 
land to increase its market potential, the by-law might also be challenged, 
on something akin to equal protection grounds, by other potential 
beneficiaries who do not fit into the by-law's defined exception. For ex-
ample, a 31-year-old who just misses the age restriction would be a more 
likely buyer of a first home than 21-year-old. The use of the zoning law to 
promote this social purpose and the rationale behind the particular 
classification used might well be held up to scrutiny. The Court did, in fact, 
leave the door open to further challenge by the plaintiffs." 
" Id. 
" /d. at 818, 402 N.E.2d at 1348. See G.L. c. 240, § 14A. 
" Id. at 818, 402 N.E.2d at 1349 . 
•• /d . 
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§ 10.2. Educational Purpose Exemption-Application to "Halfway 
Houses." During the Survey year, in Fitchburg Housing Authority v. Board 
of Zoning Appeals of Fitchburg, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court broadened 
the interpretation of what will be considered an "educational purpose" en-
titled to exemption from local ordinances and by-laws pursuant to section 2 
of the former Zoning Enabling Act. 2 The Court ruled that a residential 
facility for formerly institutionalized but educable adults with histories of 
mental difficulties, that provided them with training in such skills for in-
dependent living as self care, cooking, job seeking, budgeting and using 
community resources, was a use for a public educational purpose that could 
not be prohibited by the Fitchburg zoning ordinance. In so doing, the Court 
has provided proponents of "deinstitutionalization" with an additional 
weapon against local resistance to "halfway houses," a growing area of 
controversy. 3 
The Fitchburg Housing Authority case extends the ruling of the Appeals 
Court in Harbor Schools, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Haverhill, 4 the first 
statement on this issue. In Harbor Schools, the Appeals Court held that a· 
residential facility for the education of emotionally disturbed children is an 
educational use, but emphasized the fact that the facility's educational pro-
gram included traditional academic subjects and fulfilled the public policy 
expressed in chapter 766 of the Acts of 1972 concerning the education of 
children with special needs. 5 
In Fitchburg Housing Authority, the Fitchburg Housing Authority ap-
plied for a permit to convert a single-family house for use as a community 
residence. 6 The facility's basic purpose would be "to train people to rid 
§ 10.2. ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1465, 406 N.E.2d 1006. 
' G.L. c. 40A, § 2. Although the case was decided under the former Zoning Enabling Act, 
its application will likely extend to the counterpart provision in the new Zoning Act, G.L. c. 
40A, § 3, added by Acts of 1975, c. 808, § 3, which provides in part: 
/d. 
"No zoning ordinance or by-law shall ... prohibit, regulate or restrict the use of land 
or structures for religious purposes or for educational purposes on land owned or leased 
by the commonwealth or any of its agencies, subdivisions or bodies politic or by a 
religious sect or denomination, or by a nonprofit educational corporation; provided, 
however, that such land or structures may be subject to reasonable regulations concern-
ing the bulk and height of structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, 
open space, parking and building coverage requirements." 
' See Annot., Halfway Houses: Housing Facilities for Former Patients of Mental Hospital 
as Violating Zoning Restrictions, 100 A.L.R.3d 876 (1980); Comments; Exclusionary Zoning 
of Community Facilities, 12 N.C. CENrRAL L.J. 167 (1980); Schmedemann, Zoning for the 
Mentally Ill: A Legislative Mandate, 16 HARv. J. LEGIS. 853 (1979); Boyd, Strategies in Zoning 
and Community Living Arrangements for Retarded Citizens: Parens Patriae Meets Police 
Power, 25 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1979-1980); Witkin, But Not in My Neighborhood, PLANNING23 
(May 1981). 
• 5 Mass. App. 600, 366 N.E;2d 764 (1977). 
' See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1978 ANN. SURv. MASS. LAW,§ 11.1. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1466, 406 N.E.2d at 1007. 
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themselves of bad habits and teach them habits so that they would be 
qualified to live independently by themselves in a community."' It would 
have full-time house managers with bachelor's degrees in human services, 
and personnel would be selected on the basis of social and psychological 
training and abilities, rather than teaching qualifications. 8 None of the 
teachers would be certified. 9 The Association did not intend to accept in-
dividuals with a primary diagnosis of alcoholism, criminality, drug abuse, 
organic brain disorder, violent behavior, antisocial sexual behavior, or 
mental retardation. 10 Most of the residents would be taking prescription 
medicine under their own control. There would be no medical personnel or 
facilities on the premises, although a psychiatrist would make periodic 
visits, and a psychologist would be available.•• 
The superintendent of buildings denied the permit on the basis that such a 
residence was not allowed in the zoning district in which the building was 
located. 12 The Housing Authority and the North Central Massachusetts 
Mental Health Association, Inc., which was to operate the facility, ap-
pealed to the board of zoning appeals, seeking "authorization to operate a 
residential educational and rehabilitational facility for adults with histories 
of psychiatric difficulties" on the grounds that the use was permitted as a 
matter of law Y They based this claim on the language in the city's ordi-
nance that permitted "Private and Public Schools" in the district in ques-
tion and on the provisions of section 2 of the Zoning Enabling Act. 14 
After hearing the matter on June 5, 1978, the board of zoning appeals 
denied the application on August 2, having concluded that the use was not a 
school without addressing the question whether section 2 of the Zoning 
Enabling Act applied to the proposed use. 15 The Association and Housing 
Authority appealed this decision to the superior court, relying upon the pro-
visions of section 2 and also claiming that, because the board had not acted 
within seventy-five days of the filing of the appeal on May 10, the applica-
tion must be considered granted under the provisions of section 15 of the 
new Zoning Act! 6 
7 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1468, 406 N.E.2d at 1008. 
I /d . 
• /d. 
•• /d. at 1468, 406 N.E.2d at 1008. 
" /d. at 1467 n.5, 406 N.E.2d at 1008 n.5. 
" !d. at 1466, 406 N.E.2d at 1007. 
13 /d . 
.• !d. 
" /d. at 1466-67, 406 N.E.2d at 1007. 
" !d. at 1467, 406 N.E.2d at 1007. G.L. c. 40A, § 15, added by St. 1975, c. 808, § ·3, pro-
vides, in part, that "[t]he decision of the board shall be made within seventy-five days after the 
date of the ... application ... [with an exception not relevant here]. Failure by the board to 
act within said seventy-five days shall be deemed to be the grant of the . . . application ... 
sought." /d. Because the Supreme Judicial Court decided the case on the basis of § 2 of the 
Zoning Enabling Act, it did not address the issue whether this automatic approval provision of 
9
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The trial judge conclud~d that the proposed use was a ''medical facility,'' 
not a school, although the claim that it was a school and thus a permissible 
use under the Fitchburg ordinance had been abandoned before the superior 
court! 7 The judge acknowledged the claim that the facility was an exempt 
·educational use but did not discuss the issue in making his determination. 18 
He entered a judgment that no modification of the board's decision was 
necessary. 19 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected as erroneous the trial judge's 
characterization of the facility as a "medical facility" and the concomitant 
conclusion that the use would not be "educational. " 20 The Court noted that 
the fact that many residents had been institutionalized and would be taking 
prescription drugs did not render the facility's primary purpose medical or 
negate its educational purpose. 21 The Court also noted that the facts that 
the population was comprised of adults, that what was to be taught was not 
within traditional areas of instruction, that the teachers would not be cer- . 
tified by the state, and that the facility was residential did not preclude the 
proposed use of the facility from being educational. 22 The Court then ad-
dressed the question whether the facility's primary activity would be educa-
tional. 
Although the Court acknowledged that this case differed from Harbor 
Schools and similar out-of-state authority regarding residential facilities for 
the education of emotionally disturbed children, in that the proposed facili-
ty was not as concerned with fulfilling traditional educational goals, 23 the 
Court noted that it has long held "education" to be "a broad and com-
prehensive term." 24 Its definition includes "the process of developing ~nd 
training the powers and capabilities of human beings" and preparing in-
dividuals "for activity and usefulness in life. m' 
The Court found that the facility would fulfill an important educational 
goal in preparing its residents to live independently, emphasizing that 
"[i]nstruction in the activities of daily living is neither trivial nor un-
necessary to these persons," but an important step in developing their 
the new Zoning Act, which has no counterpart in the former act, could apply to an appeal sub-
mitted to and heard by the board of zoning appeals prior to July 1, 1978, when the new Zoning 
Act became effective in Fitchburg. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1468, 406 N.E.2d at 1008. 
II Id. 
" /d. 
20 Id. at 1469, 406 N.E.2d at 1008. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. at 1469-70, 406 N.E.2d at 1008-09. 
" Id. at 1470, 406 N.E.2d at 1009. 
24 Id. (quoting Mount Hermon Boys' School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 146, 13 N.E. 354, 357 
(1887)). 
" /d. at 1471, 406 N.E.2d at 1009, quoting Mount Hermon, note 25, supra, 145 Mass. at 
146, 13 N.E. at 357. 
10
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potential. 26 ''Inculcating a basic understanding of how to cope with every-
day problems and to maintain oneself in society is incontestably an educa-
tional process," the Court summarized. 27 It found this to be the dominant 
purpose of the proposed facility. 28 
The movement toward "deinstitutionalization" or "normalization" of 
disabled individuals in group residences such as the Fitchburg facility and 
away from large and impersonal institutions is a growing one, particularly 
in the case of the mentally ill and retarded. Yet local opposition in the very 
communities that are most appropriate for these facilities has often 
defeated this goal, frequently through the use of the zoning power. 29 One of 
the most common means of excluding such facilities is through an or-
dinance's restrictive definition of "family" for the purposes of "single 
family housing" as limited to blood-related groups or a very small number 
of unrelated individuals. This exclusionary method was given support by 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 30 which upheld a local ordinance that defined a family as no more 
than two unrelated individuals. Nevertheless, in State v. Baker, 31 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court avoided the ruling of Belle Terre by construing its 
own state constitution more strictly in determining that an ordinance pro-
hibiting more than four unrelated individuals from sharing a single housing 
unit violated the constitutional right of privacy and due process. Likewise, 
in the recent decision of City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 32 the Supreme 
Court of California relied upon its constitution to find that an ordinance 
defining "family" as related persons in a household unit or a group not to 
exceed five persons, excluding servants, living together violated the right to 
privacy. 
State legislation governing the establishment of "halfway houses" has 
been advocated as the most effective means of countering exclusionary ef-
forts. 33 In Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 34 the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled that the state's statutory scheme 
for placing developmentally impaired individuals in various locations 
throughout the state furthered an important state policy that could not be 
frustrated by local zoning regulations, which would restrict such a residence 
from meeting the requirements of a "single family dwelling." The Ohio 
26 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1471, 406 N.E.2d at 1009. 
27 /d. 
" /d. 
" See articles cited at note 3, supra. 
30 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974). 
" 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979). 
" 27 Cal.3d 123, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436 (1980). 
" See Schmedemann, Zoning for the Mentally Ill: A Legislative Mandate, 16 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 853 (1979). 
34 120 N.H. 885, 424 A.2d 207 (1980). 
11
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court, however, has been notably unsympathetic to such efforts. In Garcia 
v. Siffrin Residential Association, 3S the Ohio Supreme Court struck down a 
similar statute on the grounds that, under the Home Rule Amendment, such 
a provision could not override the local ordinance defining ''family,'' which 
had been passed for a legitimate public purpose. In Brownfield v. State, 36 
the same court determined that the establishment by the state of a halfway 
house for patients discharged from psychiatric institutions was not 
automatically exempt from local zoning provisions under the principle of 
governmental immunity. 
Approaches to the problem of group homes vary widely and are clearly 
still in flux. By interpreting existing provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act 
specifically to exempt such an institution as meeting its broad definition of 
"educational purpose," the Massachusetts Court has established an ap-
proach that may avoid the state-local conflict. While it is yet unclear how 
far the Court will go in viewing "halfway houses" as fulfilling an educa-
tional purpose-for example, whether the homes for the mentally retarded 
or other groups specifically excluded from the Fitchburg facility will qualify 
or whether eventual re-entry into society by residents will be a prereq-
uisite-advocates of deinstitutionalization are certain to regard this case as 
a major victory. 
As the Massachusetts Court takes this admirable step in expanding the 
language of the ''educational purpose'' exemption to include such uses, it is 
also important that the needs of the local communities be kept in mind. 
Steps should be taken, perhaps by the Legislature, to grant to local com-
munities some reasonable regulatory powers to ensure that these important, 
but not mainstream, educational uses will be "good neighbors." 
§ 10.3. Flood Plain Zoning-Turnpike Realty Standard Controlling. In 
1972, in Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham• the Supreme Judicial 
Court established a strong policy in support of flood plain zoning. In Turn-
pike Realty, the Court ruled that provided that there was a reasonable basis 
for including land in a flood plain district and that not all use of the land 
was prohibited, very stringent restrictions on the permitted uses did not 
amount to an unconstitutional deprivation. 2 Noting that the restrictions 
" 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980). 
" 63 Ohio St.2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980). 
§ 10.3 ' 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108, 93 S.Ct. 908, 
34 L.Ed. 689 (1973). See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1972 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAw,§ 22.5. 
' The by-law upheld in Turnpike Realty provided that: "[w]ithin a Flood Plain District no 
structure or building shall be erected, altered or used, and no premises shall be used except for 
one or more of the following uses: Any woodland, grassland, wetland, agricultural, hor-
ticultural or recreational use of land or water not requiring filling. Buildings and sheds ac-
cessory to any of the Flood Plain uses are permitted on approval of the Board of Appeals." 
362 Mass. at 224, 284 N.E.2d at 894. 
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placed on an individual's land must be balanced against the potential harm 
to the community from uncontrolled development of flood plain land, the 
Court listed the following as important public policy objectives of flood 
plain zoning: 
(1) the protection of individuals who might choose, despite the flood 
dangers, to develop or occupy land on a flood plain; (2) the protec-
tion of other landowners from damages resulting from development 
of a flood plain and the consequent obstruction of the flood flow; 
(3) the protection of the entire community from individual choices of 
land use which require subsequent public expenditures for public 
works and disaster relief. 3 
Citing the Connecticut decision of Vartelas v. Water Resources Commis-
sion, 4 the Court emphasized the distinction between this type of protective 
regulation and eminent domain: "The police power regulates use of prop-
erty because uncontrolled use would be harmful to the public interest. Emi-
nent domain, on the other hand, takes private property because it is useful 
to the public." 5 
Two 1980 cases reaffirmed the continued vitality of Turnpike Realty with 
regard to flood plain zoning. InS. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v. Board of 
Appeals of Concord, 6 the Appeals Court, relying on Turnpike Realty 
upheld the local board's denial of a special permit to fill a canal on land 
within the town's flood plain zone. 7 In Turner v. Town of Walpole, 8 the 
Appeals Court again found Turnpike Realty to be controlling. The court 
upheld the land court's decision that the town's flood plain district was not 
confiscatory, barring evidence showing that the plaintiff's land was not sub-
ject to flooding and so long as the plaintiff was not deprived of all use. 9 
In S. Kemble Fischer, the Appeals Court found that the trial judge's find-
ings of fact amply supported his determination that the board had been cor-
rect in denying the permit. 10 These facts showed that the land in question 
' /d. at 228, 284 N.E.2d at 896. 
• 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822 (1959). 
' 362 Mass. at 235, 284 N.E.2d at 899, (quoting Vartelas, 146 Conn. at 654, 153 A.2d at 
824). 
• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 637, 402 N.E.2d 100. 
' /d. at 641, 402 N.E.2d at 103.01. Initially, the court addressed a threshold procedural 
issue. The plaintiff claimed that the findings of the trial court were inconsistent with facts con-
tained in responses of the board to requests for admissions made pursuant to MASs. R. C1v. P. 
36(a). /d. at 637, 402 N.E.2d at 100. The court rejected this claim, pointing out that, as with all 
forms of discovery, facts must be introduced into the record in order for a party to rely on 
them. /d. at 638, 402 N.E.2d at 102. The court compared the plaintiff's attempt to argue the 
importance of facts not before the court to trying to argue on appeal a point of law that was 
not before the trial judge. /d. at 639, 402 N.E.2d at 102. 
• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1745, 409 N.E.2d 807. 
• /d. at 1745-46, 409 N.E.2d at 808. 
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 639-40, 402 N.E.2d at 102. 
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was subject to flooding and that filling it would defeat the canal's drainage 
function. •• Filling the land would increase the velocity of water flow over a 
dam, possibly eroding the dam, wasJ;rlng out fill, and changing the course of 
a river. 12 Filling would also reduce the water storage in the land, affect other 
properties, and cause stagnation and pollution in the unfilled end of the 
canal. 13 
The applicable provision of the Concord j)y-law provided that no land fill 
was permitted ''in any part of the Flood Plain Conservancy District'' 
without a special permit, which could be issued only if it were "proven to 
the satisfaction of the Board of Appeals, after the question has been re-
ferred to and reported on by the Planning Board and the Board of Health, 
as being in fact not subject to flooding or not unsuitable because of 
drainage conditions . . . and that the use . . . will not be detrimental to the 
public health, safety or welfare." 14 The planning board determined that the 
fill would interfere with the purpose of the Flood Plain Conservation 
District and the board of health reported that it would be detrimental to the 
public health by increasing pollution and stagnation in a section of water. 15 
The court concluded that these reports precluded any claim that the board 
of appeals had acted in an unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary manner or 
on a legally untenable ground-the only bases for overturning a board's 
decision to deny a permit_. 6 
The plaintiff also attacked the by-law as unconstitutional, claiming that 
because the by-law left him without any practical use of the property, it ef-
fected a taking without just compensation.•' The court found that this claim 
was untenable following Turnpike Realty, despite the plaintiff's attempt to 
sidestep that decision by relying on the trial judge's finding that he could 
not use the land "as it is now for access, general recreation or other uses 
permitted within the Flood Plain Conservancy District." 18 The court 
pointed out that the judge also had found that the plaintiff's land was not 
worthless and had noted that the record did not show that he could not use 
his land for some purpose not requiring filling, such as to enhance his land 
outside the flood plain_. 9 
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to use section l.B of the 
zoning by-law, which permits an owner whose lot straddles zoning districts 




14 Id. at 640, 402 N.E.2d at 103. 
15 /d. 
" /d., at 640-41, 402 N.E.2d at 103. 
17 Id. at 641, 402 N.E.2d at 103. 
11 /d., 402 N.E.2d at 104. 
19 /d. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/13
----------
§ 10.3 ZONING AND LAND USE 403 
to exempt a thirty-foot strip of his land from the flood plain zoning. 20 The 
court noted that the flood plain district is an overlay zone imposed over any 
underlying use district. 21 Because the subjecting of land to flood plain 
restrictions is a function of the grade of the land, as specified in another sec-
tion of the by-law, these controls override the controls of the underlying 
zone. 22 
In Turner v. Town of Walpole, the plaintiff similarly tried to avoid the 
rule of Turnpike Realty by distinguishing the facts. The plaintiff asserted 
that Walpole's by-law did not provide any special permit procedure allow-
ing the building of residential and business buildings in the flood plain 
district, whereas it did authorize such permits for industrial and manufac-
turing uses. 23 The court deferred to the judgment of the town meeting in 
establishing the by-law, noting that it reasonably could have determined 
that the latter uses were more able to provide flood protection devices or to 
cope with flooding than the former. 24 The court also found that the town 
meeting's action reflected the policy concerns of flood plain zoning outlined 
in Turnpike Realty25 and were consistent with the requirements of the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Act. 26 
The strong policy in support of flood plain zoning in Massachusetts 
established by Turnpike Realty has clearly not been eroded. Unless a 
municipality has no basis for including the land in such a district or pro-
hibits all use of the land, the validity of flood plain zoning will be upheld. 
This may appear to be a harsh limitation, particularly in view of the natural 
tendency of landowners to assume that they can "improve" any land they 
own to suit their purposes. However, it is arguable that certain land with in-
herent restrictions, such as land subject to flooding, is taken by a landowner 
subject to present, not speculative uses. If land has always been a swamp 
and, over several centuries, no "improvements" have been made, it is dif-
ficult for the landowner to argue economic loss or to claim entitlement to 
make significant changes, especially when those changes could have an 
adverse impact on others. The present, valid use of such land, however 
limited, may be all that a landowner is entitled to enjoy and sufficient to 
avoid the taking issue. 
20 /d. at 642, 402 N.E.2d at 104. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
" !d. at 1746, 409 N.E.2d at 808. 
24 /d. 
" /d., see text and note at note 3 supra. 
" The federal government attempted to control flood losses through a massive system of 
public works, such as dams and levees, but this system failed to reduce losses, and it was deter-
mined that the only way to ensure control of damages was to restrict the development of land 
that is subject to flooding. Through the Flood Insurance Act of 1956 and the National Flood 
Insurance Program passed in 1968, states and municipalities have been required to adopt flood 
plain regulations. 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW,§§ 158.17-158.19; 2 R. 
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING,§ 9.45. 15
Huber: Chapter 10: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital ommons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
404 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §10.4 
§ 10.4. Open Meeting Law-Applicability to Zoning Board of Ap-
peals. During the Survey year, the Appeals Court ruled that a meeting of a 
zoning board of appeals considering an application for a special permit falls 
within the purview of the Massachusetts open meeting law. 1 In Yaro v. 
Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 2 the zoning board of appeals of New-
buryport, following proper notice, held a public hearing on July 10, 1979, 
to consider a petition for a special permit to build residential condomin-
iums. Following two hours of public discussion of the issue at the hearing, 3 
the board adjourned. • Its members then moved to another room in the city 
hall where they deliberated and voted in favor of the petition.' Neither min-
utes nor a roll call vote were taken during the twenty-minute meeting, which 
took place in the absence of the public, as was the board's practice.' On July 
19, the board members signed their written decision, and on July 23, it was 
flled with the city clerk and copies were mailed to the interested parties/ 
The plaintiffs, four registered voters of the city, brought an action in the 
superior court seeking invalidation of the decision alleging that, in holding 
the private meeting, the board had not complied with the open meeting re-
quirement of chapter 39 of the General Laws. The plaintiffs claimed that 
the board was a "governmental body" as defined in section 23A • and was, 
therefore, subject to the provisions of section 23B, which require that "[a]ll 
meetings of a governmental body shall be open to the public."' 
The court first noted that the board would not be required to adhere to 
the open meeting requirements if to do so would be inconsistent with the 
board's obligations under other statutes. 10 The board argued that the open-
meeting requirement conflicted with sections 11 and 15 of chapter 40, the 
zoning statute. 11 These sections concern notice, public hearings, and pro-
cedures for taking appeals to permit-granting authorities. 12 The court found 
§ 10.4. I G.L. c. 39, §§ 23A-23C. 
' 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1839, 410 N.E.2d 72S. 





' Section 23A defmes a "governmental body" as "every board, commission, committee or 
subcommittee of any district, city, region or town, however elected, appointed or otherwise 
constituted, and the governing body of a local housing, redevelopment or similar authority." 
G.L. c. 39, § 23A. 
'Id., § 23B. 
11 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1841,410 N.E.2d at 727. G.L. c. 39, § 24 provides that 
"(t]he provisions of this chapter shall be in force only so far as they are not inconsistent with 
the express provisions of any provisions of any general or special law; and so far as apt, shall 
apply to districts as defmed in section A of chapter 40." Id. 
11 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1841, 410 N.E.2d at 727. 
11 G.L. c. 40A, §111, IS. 
16
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that the purpose of these sections was to stabilize property uses in the in-
terest of the public, by preventing alterations in zoning laws without full 
notice and opportunity for public protest.' 3 
The court rejected the board's claim that the zoning statutes are inconsist-
ent with the open meeting requirement. The board argued that the 
legislature did not intend that a zoning board of appeals "deliberate and 
write their decision in the public arena." 14 The court found this to be an ex-
aggerated characterization of the impact of the open meeting law upon the 
functioning of a zoning board." The court noted that section 15 of the zon-
ing statute itself requires a public hearing, 16 and that the open meeting law 
simply mandates that the board "deliberate and arrive at its decision under 
public observation. " 17 The court also noted that the open meeting law does 
not require verbal public participation during board deliberations or public 
scrutiny of the actual writing of a decision, once it has been reached at an 
open meeting at which accurate records have been kept. 11 Thus, the court 
concluded that the open meeting requirement was not inconsistent with the 
board's obligation under sections 11 and 15 of chapter 40A of the General 
Laws. 
The board also relied upon section 9 of chapter 40A to support its claim 
of inconsistency with the open meeting law. 19 Section 9 of chapter 40A pro-
vides that if a board does not decide upon an application for a special per-
mit within ninety days after the public hearing, the application shall be con-
sidered approved. 20 The board contended that, since it could "act through 
inaction," section 23B does not apply to it. 21 The court responded to this 
contention by simply stating that when the board does choose to act by 
meeting and deliberating, as it had in this case, the requirements of section 
23B must be met. 22 The court averred that no responsible body would at-
tempt to avoid the provisions of the open meeting law by approving all re-
quests through habitual inaction. 23 
Thus, the court rejected the board's contention that the open meeting 
statute did not apply to zoning boards of appeals. Since the superior court 
judge found the statutory provisions to be inconsistent, he had neither 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1842, 410 N.E.2d at 727-28. 
14 ld., 410 N.E.2d at 728. 
IS Jd, 
" ld. at 1842-43, 410 N.E.2d at 728. G.L. c. 40A, § IS provides, in relevant part, that: "[a]ll 
hearings of the board of appeals shall be open to the public." I d. 
17 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1842-43, 410 N.E.2d at 728. 
11 Id. at 1843, 410 N.E.2d at 728 . 
.. ld. 
20 G.L. c. 40A,§ 9. 
21 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1843-44, 410 N.E.2d at 728-29. 
22 ld . 
.. ld. 
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issued an order to the board not to violate section 23B in future meetings 
nor considered whether to use his discretionary power to invalidate the 
board's decision. 24 Therefore, the appeals court remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings. 25 
After the Yaro decision, local boards are on notice that they must comply 
with the provisions of the open meeting law. This does not mean that all 
deliberations must take place in a public forum, but simply that notice of all 
meetings be given and that they be open to observation by members of the 
public who choose to attend. Furthermore, the actual writing of decisions 
need not be performed at open sessions, provided that this step is merely the 
recording of previously made decisions and does not affect the substance of 
those decisions. 
This type of quasi-judicial decision-making differs from true judicial 
deliberations and can, therefore, more reasonably be undertaken in public. 
In the case of judicial decisions, where precedent is being developed or cases 
are being fitted into existing precedent, issues beneath the surface must 
often be raised. However, in the case of a special permit, in which issues and 
evidence are well-defined and the standards are clearly set forth by the or-
dinance, there is less need for privacy in deliberations. This decision does 
not demand that board members make their decision immediately following 
a public meeting. They can take time to digest and think over matters before 
meeting again to vote. Because closed sessions always carry the potential for 
abuse, it is best that meetings of the board of appeals be open to the public, 
particularly when there is no inconsistency between the goals of the open 
meeting law and those of the enabling act that created the decision-making 
body. 
§ 10.5. Subdivision Control Law-Endorsement of Plans Not Re-
quiring Approval. Section 81P of the Massachusetts Subdivision Control 
Law 1 provides that a municipal planning board shall endorse plans that do 
not require the board's approval under the law. 2 Before this section was 




§ 10.5. I G.L. c. 41, §§ 81K-GG. 
' Section SIP provides, in part: 
''Any person wishing to cause to be recorded a plan of land situated in a city or town in 
which the subdivision control law is in effect, who believes that his plan does not require 
approval under the subdivision control law, may submit his plan to the planning board 
of such city or town and, if the board finds that the plan does not require such approval, 
it shall forthwith, without a public hearing, endorse thereon ... the words 'approval 
under the subdivision control law not required' or words of similar import with ap-
propriate name or names signed thereto, and such endorsement shall be conclusive on 
all persons." 
18
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plans that did not require the board's approval. The endorsement required a 
determination by the register as to whether the submitted plan, in fact, 
showed a subdivision-a quasi-judicial function that was neither tradition-
ally nor appropriately a part of the register's role. The addition of section 
SIP was designed to relieve the register of that burden by requiring the plan-
ning board to make this initial determination and providing that the register 
cannot record a plan unless it is endorsed by the planning board as either 
approved or not requiring .approval. 3 Three cases decided during the 1980 
Survey year, which involved a board's denial of an endorsement of plans as 
"not requiring approval," provide guidance as to the appropriate role of 
the board in making this determination. 
In Gallitano v. Board of Survey and Planning of Waltham, 4 the Appeals 
Court upheld a superior court determination that the planning board had 
improperly withheld an endorsement of a plan.' The plaintiff's proposed 
plan would have divided a parcel, which had access to a public way at two 
separate points along different sides of the lot, into four separate lots. 6 
Each of the lots had at least twenty feet of frontage on a public way, as re-
quired by section 81L.7 One large lot used all the access along one side, 
while the three smaller lots had access along the other side. 8 Two of these 
lots were dogleg in shape, narrowing as they angled to the road to provide 
access to wider sections that complied with the city's width and side yard re-
quirements.9 The lots all met the city's other requirements for a buildable 
lot, which did not include a minimum frontage requirement, ' 0 as well as the 
twenty-foot frontage minimum required by section 81L of the Subdivision 
Control Law." 
The planning board alleged that despite the literal compliance with the 
public access requirements, the proposed plan would leave some of the lots 
without clear access to utility and municipal services and would create a 
traffic hazard.' 2 On this basis, the planning board offered affidavits of city 
fire, police, traffic, and public works officials in support of its motion for 
summary judgment.' 3 The officials' chief concern was with two dogleg lots 
one with a forty foot access and one with a twenty foot access.' 4 They 
claimed that because the houses would likely be invisible from the road, fire 
3 ld., Johnson, "Conveyancing," 1954 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW, § 2.7. 
• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1397, 407 N.E.2d 359. 
' /d. at 1402, 407 N.E.2d at 362. 
' Id. at 1397-98, 407 N.E.2d at 359-60. 
7 Id. at 1398, 407 N.E.2d at 360 . 




12 Id. at 1398-99, 407 N.E.2d at 360. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. at 1399, 407 N.E.2d at 360. 
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and police response to emergencies would be jeopardized and the cost of 
running utility lines would be heightened." The board claimed, in sum, that 
the lots had ''too narrow a frontage, too long a neck and enter ... Beaver 
Street at too acute an angle." 16 
The board relied on Gifford v. Planning Board of Nantucket, 17 where the 
court held that the plan was "an attempted evasion" of the subdivision con-
trollaw. In Gifford, a proposed plan showed a division of a parcel into 
forty-six lots, each of which met the zoning frontage and area requirements 
only by means of connector strips, some over a thousand feet long and nar-
rowing to as little as seven feet. 11 The Court noted that the plan was "a 
quite exceptional case" in which some of the lots "are practically inacces-
sible from their respective borders on a public way." 19 
In denying the board's appeal, the Appeals Court distinguished Gifford, 
pointing out that in the present case, access would not be difficult, and that 
the twenty foot access strip never narrowed further. zo The court noted that 
any difficulties that might exist in the plan are inherent in a zoning ordi-
nance that does not require minimum frontage, regulate the widths or 
angles of driveways, or require that dwellings be visible from the street. 21 
The court also stated that the development of back lots is foreseeable in a 
zoning scheme requiring a 100-foot lot width minimum but less frontage. 
The court emphasized that it is beyond the power of the planning board to 
rectify such a scheme whether or not it be a conscious choice on the part of 
the town to allow such development. zz In sum, the court stated that the 
board is limited to acting principally through its regulations and has no 
power to pass regulations governing "the size, shape, width, [or] frontage 
... of lots."23 
In Smalley v. Planning Board of Harwich, 24 the Appeals Court also 
upheld a superior court determination that a planning board had erroneous-
ly refused an endorsement of a plan and further delineated the appropriate 
role of the board in reviewing plans under section 81P. In Smalley, the 
plaintiff had submitted a plan subdividing a parcel of 34,925 square feet in-
to two lots-one with an area of 14,897 containing the residence from the 
original parcel and one with an area of 20,028 containing a barn. 25 Each lot 
had frontage on a public way greater than the 100-foot minimum required 
" ld. 
" ld. at l400, 407 N.E.2d at 361. 
" 376 Mass. 801, 383 N.E.2d 1123 (1978). 
" /d. at 808-09, 383 N.E.2d at 1126-61 . 
.. /d. 
20 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1401, 407 N.E.2d at 362. 
21 Id. at 1400, 407 N.E.2d at 361-62. 
22 /d. 
21 Id. at 1400-01, 407 N.E.2d at 362 (quoting G.L. c. 41, § 81L). 
24 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1867, 410 N.E.2d 1219 . 
., /d. at 1868, 410 N.E.2d at 1220. 
20
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by the zoning ordinance. 2' The smaller lot did not conform to the by-law's 
20,000 square foot minimum, however, and the plan also contained some 
violations of the side-line requirements. 27 
The board grounded its refusal to grant the endorsement on the basis of 
these violations of the zoning law, relying on section 81M of chapter 41 of 
the General Laws. 21 This section sets out the general purposes of the sub-
division control law stating in part that "[t]he powers of a planning board 
. . . under the subdivision control law shall be exercised with due regard ... 
for insuring compliance with the applicable zoning ordinances or by-
laws."29 
The court concluded that section 81P did not place on the board the same 
responsibilities and duties the board holds when considering approval of a 
subdivision. 30 The court stated that the legislative history of the provision 
supported the conclusion that the section's purpose was to alleviate the 
"difficulty ... encountered by registers of deeds in deciding whether a plan 
showing ways and lots could lawfully be recorded, " 31 and not to enlarge the 
substantive powers of the board. 32 The court stated further that section 81P 
simply provides a simple method of informing the register that the board is 
not concerned with a plan "because the vital access is reasonably 
guaranteed. ' 033 
The court described the endorsement procedure as routine in nature, 
noting that an endorsement is to be made "forthwith, without a public 
hearing'' and pointing to the 1961 amendment to the section which provides 
that "[s]uch endorsement shall not be withheld unless such plan shows a 
subdivision. " 34 Further, the court rejected the board's reliance upon the 
general provisions of section 81M. 35 In doing so, the court noted that if the 
planning board were considered responsible "for insuring compliance with 
the applicable zoning [laws]" for the purposes of a section 81P endorse-
ment, it would also logically be responsible for such other provisions of sec-
tion 81M as "securing adequate provisions for water, sewerage, drainage, 
[and] underground utility services. " 3' The court emphasized that a section 
81P endorsement is not a statement that these matters are satisfactory to the 
board, but merely a determination as to whether a plan shows a 
subdivision. 37 




•• /d. at 1870, 410 N.E.2d at 1221. 
" Id. (citing 19S3 House Docket No. 2249, at SS). 
n /d. at 1871, 410 N.E.2d at 1222. 
, /d. 
•• Id. at 1871-72, 410 N.E.2d at 1222. 
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The court also denied the board's argument that the recording of a plan 
showing a zoning violation serves no legitimate purpose, pointing out that 
recording could be a preliminary step to applying for a variance or buying 
'from or selling to an abutter in order to bring the lot into compliance. 31 
Finally, the court rejected the board's argument that the phrase "used, or 
available for use" in the definition of "lot" in section 81L means a lot that 
meets the zoning requirements, thereby excluding the plaintiff's land from 
qualifying as an exception to the definition of subdivision in that section. 39 
The court characterized the board's reasoning as "self-defeating," stating 
that such reasoning would also take the plan out of the definition of a sub-
division, as subdivision is defined as "the division of a tract of land into two 
or more lots."40 Thus, the court held that if the plan did not create a sub-
division, the board would be required to endorse it. 41 
In Richard v. Planning Board of Achushnet, 42 the Appeals Court af-
firmed the superior court determination that the planning board had acted 
within its authority in refusing to endorse the plaintiff's plan as "approval 
under the subdivision control law not required. " 43 Following the planning 
board's failure to endorse his plan, the plaintiff appealed to the superior 
court claiming entitlement to a section 81P endorsement. 44 The plaintiff 
claimed that he was merely altering the boundaries of lots on an already ap-
proved subdivision plan. 45 He claimed further that he had to make the 
charges in order to comply with changes made in the minimum lot area re-
quirements of the zoning law since approval of his original plan. 46 He con-
tended that the new plan did not show a subdivision because the lots drawn 
all had the required frontage on "a way shown on a plan theretofore ap-
proved and endorsed in accordance with the subdivision control law," pur-
suant to exception (b) of the definition of the word "subdivision" in the 
General Laws. 47 The prior endorsement on which the plaintiff relied had 
been granted 18 years earlier, in 1960, by the town's board of selectmen, 
who were acting in a temporary capacity as a planning board. 48 The plan 
showed a subdivision of 26 lots and a layout of three proposed streets. 49 At 
the time of the plaintiff's request for endorsement of its revised plan in 
1978, none of the streets had been built, and no houses had been con-
,. /d. 
" /d. at 1872, 410 N.E.2d at 1223. 
•• Id. at 1872-73, 410 N.E.2d at 1223. 
•• /d. at 1873, 410 N.E.2d at 1223. 
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1331, 406 N.E.2d 728. 
•• /d. at 1331, 406 N.E.2d at 729 . 
•• /d . 
•• /d . 
•• /d . 
., /d. at 1331-32, 406 N.E.2d at 729 . 
•• /d . 
•• /d. 
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structed on lots that were material to the present action. 50 In addition, the 
locus had been the site of gravel excavation and was now twenty-five feet 
below the grade of the surrounding land. 51 
The parties framed the question before the court as whether a plan 
previously approved as complying with the then applicable zoning require-
ments is exempt from further control, where the ways in the plan are only 
"paper streets." 52 According to this characterization of the question, the 
court would have to determine whether the plan would technically involve a 
subdivision, or whether the earlier approval removed the plan from the sub-
division category. 53 The court rejected this characterization of the issues 
benefited. Such a statement, the court pointed out, ignored many signifi-
cant variables. For example, if an earlier approved plan contained condi-
tions that had not been met, then a new plan would not be exempt from sub-
division control. 54 On the other hand, if the landowner has filed a bond, 
deposited money or negotiated securities, or entered into a covenant to 
secure the construction of ways and the installation of municipal services, a 
new plan that merely alters the number, shape, and size of lots would be en-
titled to endorsement as not requiring approval under section SIP. 55 
The court noted that the provisions in section 81U, regarding the comple-
tion of the ways and municipal services of a subdivision plan, are manda-
tory. 56 The court also noted that in endorsing the plaintiff's original plan in 
1960, the town selectmen had not set forth the manner in which the ways 
were to be built, the principal services which were to be provided, or the 
standards which the work must meet. 57 The court concluded that exception 
(b) of the definition of subdivision in section 81L, upon which the plaintiff 
relied, requires that the approved ways have been built or that there be 




" /d. at 1332-33, 406 N.E.2d at 730. 
,. /d. at 1333, 406 N.E.2d at 730. 
" /d. 
" /d., G.L. c. 41, § 81U provides, in part: 
/d. 
"Before endorsement of its approval of a plan, a planning board shall require that con-
struction of ways and the installation of municipal services be secured by one, or in part 
by one and in part by the other, of the methods described in the following clauses (1) 
(providing for a proper bond or a deposit of money or negotiable securities ''to secure 
performance of the construction of ways and the installation of municipal services re-
quired for lots in the subdivision shown on the plan ... "I and (2) [providing for a cove-
nant "whereby such ways and services shall be provided to serve any lot before such lot 
may be built upon or conveyed, other than by mortgage deed ... "],which method may 
be selected and from time to time by the applicant." 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1333-34, 406 N.E.2d at 730. 
" /d., 406 N.E.2d at 731. 
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other conclusion would controvert the essential role of the subdivision con-
trollaw in ensuring that ways and services will be constructed according to 
municipal standards. 59 The court noted that this was especially true in a case 
such as Richard in which the locus was 25 feet below the surrounding land, 
warranting municipal concern about the safety of the grades of access roads 
and the adequacy of drainage facilities. 60 
In sum, the Appeals Court in 1980 made clear that the role of the plan-
ning board in passing on a request for a section 81P endorsed is a limited 
one. The board simply must make a determination as to whether, according 
to the definition of "subdivision" in section 81L, a plan shows a subdivi-
sion, in which case it requires approval by the board, or does not show a 
subdivision, in which case it must receive an endorsement as not requiring 
approval by the board. The planning board cannot use this provision to 
force a landowner to comply with the municipality's zoning by-laws or to 
conform with its own view of desirable traffic and safety standards. On the 
other hand, an application for such endorsement cannot circumvent the 
goals of the subdivision control law where the very access to public ways 
that exempts a plan from the law does not exist in any bona fide, mean-
ingful form. 
§ 10.6. Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning By-Laws. Absent 
a statutory provision to the contrary, a state and its agencies are not subject 
to the zoning regulations of municipalities. 1 During the Survey year, in 
County Commissioners of Bristol v. Conservation Commission of Dart-
mouth, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court rejected a town's attempt to invoke the 
provisions of the Zoning Act3 and the Home Rule Amendment• to subject 
the construction of a county jail to the requirements of the town's zoning 
ordinance. 
In 1973, the Legislature authorized the County Commissioners of Bristol 
County to construct a new jail and to acquire the necessary land by pur-
chase or eminent domain. s After appropriate study, the County Commis-
sioners decided to build the facility in the town of Dartmouth in an area 
zoned for limited industrial use. 6 In compliance with the requirements of 
chapter 131, section 40,' the commissioners applied to the Conservation 
.. /d. 
60 /d. 
§ 10.6. 1 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (2d ed. 1977), § 12.06. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1289, 405 N.E.2d 637. 
' G.L. c. 40A. 
• Art. 2 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 89 of 
the Amendments. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1289, 405 N.E.2d at 637. 
• Id. at 1289-90, 405 N.E.2d at 637-38. 
' Chapter 131, section 7 requires, in part, that: 
"[n}o person shall remove, fill, dredge or alter any bank, fresh water wetland, coastal 
24
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Commission of Dartmouth for a determination as to what controls, if any, 
were to be applied to the construction of the proposed jail to meet the en-
vironmental considerations covered by that statute. • Following a determina-
tion by the Conservation Commission that the site fell within the scope of 
the statute, the County Commissioners filed with the Conservation Com-
mission the required notice of intent to engage in construction activity on 
the land. 9 
The Conservation Commission, relying on chapter 31, section 40, • 0 
notified the County Commissioners that it could not accept their notice un-
til they had applied for a zoning variance. 11 
The County Commissioners obtained a declaratory judgment from the 
superior court that the planned county use gave the land immunity from the 
local by-law. 12 The Conservation Commission filed a motion to alter or 
amend judgment, claiming that the presumption of immunity from 
municipal zoning contravened the Home Rule Amendment. 13 The superior 
court denied the motion, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the superior court, holding that the land upon which the county jail 
was to be built was exempt from Dartmouth's zoning by-laws. 14 
The Court examined the origins and use of the immunity rule in 
Massachusetts by looking at three earlier cases. In Teasdale v. Newell & 
Snowling Construction Co., 15 the Court held that a contractor hired by the 
metropolitan park commissioners for work on land taken for park purposes 
was exempted from the community's health laws, which prohibited stables 
needed by the contractor for workhorses. 16 In City of Medford v. Marinucci 
/d. 
wetland, beach, dune, flat, marsh, meadow or swamp bordering on the ocean or on any 
estuary, creek, river, stream, pond, or lake, or any land under said waters or any land 
subject to tidal action, coastal storm flowage, or flooding, other than in the course of 
maintaining, repairing or replacing, but not substantially changing or enlarging, an ex-
isting and lawfully located structure or facility used in the service of the public and used 
to provide electric, gas, water, telephone, telegraph and other telecommunication serv-
ices, without filing written notice of his intention to so remove, fill, dredge or alter, in-
cluding such plans as may be necessary to describe such proposed activity and its effect 
on the environment. . . . Said notice shall be sent by certified mail to the conservation 
commissioner or, if none to the board of selectmen in a town or the mayor of a city in 
which the land upon which such activity is proposed is located. . . . Upon written re-
quest of any person, the conservation commission shall within ten days make a written 
determination as to whether this section is applicable to any land 01: work thereon." 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1290, 40S N.E.2d at 638 . 
• /d. 
•• G.L. c. 31, § 40. 
" Id. at 1290-91, 40S N.E.2d at 638. 
12 /d. at 1291, 40S N.E.2d at 638. 
" /d. 
14Jd. 
" 192 Mass. 440, 78 N.E. S04 (1906). 
" /d. at 443, 78 :N.E. at S04. 
25
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Bros. &: Co., 17 a contractor hired by the Department of Public Works to 
build a section of interstate highway was allowed to build a railroad loading 
area in a location zoned for single residence housing. 11 In Village on the Hill 
v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 1' the Turnpike Authority, after tak-
ing land by eminent domain from a corporation, contracted to sell to the 
corporation another lot on which to rebuild its plant. 20 The plaintiff peti-
tioned for a writ of mandamus to compel tlie building commissioner to en-
force the Boston zoning law, which placed part of his new lot in a residential 
district. 21 At the time of the action, title to the lot and the building being 
constructed upon it remained in the Turnpike Authority. 22 The Court found 
that the property was not subject to the zoning regulation stating that the 
Turnpike Authority was a body politic . . . performing an essentially 
governmental function. 23 The reasoning in all these cases is well summa-
rized by language from Medford v. Marinucci Bros.&: Co.: "[W]e cannot 
conclude that by enacting the Zoning Enabling Act the Legislature intended 
to authorize a municipality to thwart the Commonwealth in carrying out the 
functions of government. 0024 
The Court in County Commissioners of Bristol then reconfirmed the im-
munity rule, stating that "an entity or agency created by the Massachusetts 
Legislature is immune from municipal zoning regulations at least insofar as 
that entity or agency is performing an essential governmental function ab-
sent statutory provision to the contrary. " 25 The Court concluded that a 
county was such an entity. 26 The Court found clear support that the county 
was performing "an essential governmental function" in the specific 
language of chapter 34, section 3, which provides, in part, that "[e]ach 
county shall provide suitable jails, houses of correction, fireproof offices 
and other public buildings necessary for its use. " 27 
The Conservation Commission argued that section 3 of the Zoning Act 
itself expressly limits immunity from local by-laws to land used for religious 
or educational purposes. 21 The Court rejected the commission's reading of 
" 344 Mass. SO, 181 N.E.2d 584 (1962); see Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1962 ANN. SURv. 
MASS. LAW, § 13.5. 
" 344 Mass. at 53, 181 N.E.2d at 586. 
" 348 Mass. 107, 202 N.E.2d 602 (1964); see Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1964 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW, § 14.24. 
20 348 Mass. at 117, 202 N.E.2d at 610. 
" /d. at 109, 202 N.E.2d at 604-05. 
22 /d. 
" /d. at 119, 202 N.E.2d at 611. 
24 344 Mass. at 57, 181 N.E.2d at 588. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1293, 405 N.E.2d at 640. 
" /d. at 1293-94, 405 N.E.2d at 640. 
" /d. at 1294, 405 N.E.2d at 640. 
" ld. at 1295, 405 N.E.2d at 641. The section 3 of the Zoning Act provides that: 
(n]o zoning ordinance or by-law shall ... prohibit, regulate or restrict the use of land or 
structures for religious purposes or for educational purposes on land owned or leased by 
26
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this provision, stating that it had failed to read the statute as a whole and to 
interpret the section in light of the statutory purposes of the Zoning Act. 29 
The Court found that the commission's interpretation would defeat the 
act's purpose of facilitating public requirements and would effectively allow 
municipalities to preempt the construction of all facilities at the state or the 
county level. 30 The Court also found that the commission had misconstrued 
the purpose of section 3. The Court stated that the specific mention of 
religious and educational facilities did not exclude all other uses from im-
munity to local by-laws. Rather, the provision made these formerly totally 
exempt institutions subject to reasonable local dimensional requirements 
without making them subject to local zoning requirements. 31 In addition, 
the Court noted that in the past the Legislature had been specific when it 
granted a veto power to a municipality over any legislative action. 32 
The Conservation Commission's final argument was that the superior 
court's decision was contrary to both the "spirit and letter" of the Home 
Rule Amendment, which provides a direct constitutional grant of power to 
municipalities. 33 The Court cited Bloom v. Worcester34 as the source of the 
standard for determining whether a local by-law is "not consistent" with 
the commonwealth or any of its agencies, subdivisions or bodies politic or by a religious 
sect or denomination, or by a nonprofit educational corporation; provided, however, 
that such land or structures may be subject to reasonable regulations concerning the 
bulk and height of structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, open space, 
parking and building coverage requirements. 
G.L. c. 40A § 3. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1295, 405 N.E.2d at 641. G.L. c. 40A, § 2A states, in part, that 
This act is designed to provide standardized procedures for the administration and pro-
mulgation of municipal laws. This section is designed to suggest objectives for which 
zoning might be established which include, but are not limited to, the following: ... to 
facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, water supply, drainage, 
sewerage, schools, parks, open space and other public requirements. 
/d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1296, 405 N.E.2d at 641. 
31 ld. 
" Id. The court cited the provisions of G.L. c. 34, § 25, as exemplifying this practice. This 
section authorizes county commissioners to acquire "such real property within their respective 
counties as may be necessary to maintain, improve, protect, limit the future use of or otherwise 
conserve and properly utilize open spaces, and may control and manage the same; provided 
that such acquisition has been approved by the department of environmental management and 
the conservation committee of the city or town within which the land lies, or if such city or 
town has no conservation committee, by a two thirds vote of the city council in the case of a 
city and by a two thirds vote of the board of selectmen in the case of a town .... " !d. (em-
phasis supplied by the Court). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1297, 405 N.E.2d at 641. 
" Art. 2 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 89 of 
the Amendments, § 2. The Amendment reads, in part: "Any city or town may, by the adop-
tion, amendment, or repeal of the local ordinances or by-laws, exercise any power or function 
which the general court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the con-
stitution or laws enacted by the general court in conformity with powers reserved to the general 
court by section eight." ld. 27
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the laws enacted by the Legislature in conformity with its reserved powers. 35 
The Bloom decision likened the process to that used in federal preemption 
cases and other cases involving "inconsistent" local ordinances, noting that 
even if the Legislature has not expressly indicated its intent in this regard, an 
intention to bar local by-laws that exercise control over the same subject as 
the legislation may still be inferred. 36 The Bloom Court also stated that if 
the state legislative purpose can be achieved in the face of a local by-law on 
the same subject, the local by-law would not be considered inconsistent with 
that legislation. 37 
The Court in the County Commissioners of Bristol case found that the 
purpose of the statute in question unequivocally empowered the commis-
sioners to construct the jail and related facilities within the county and to 
"acquire any land and buildings that may be necessary for this construc-
tion. " 38 Because the municipal ordinance impeded the commissioners' abili-
ty to carry out these tasks, the Court found the ordinance to be inconsistent 
with the statute and, therefore, not authorized by the Home Rule Amend-
ment.39 
The final issue before the Court was whether the statute conformed with 
the requirements of section 8 of the Home Rule Amendment, which pro-
vides that "[t]he general court shall have the power to act in relation to 
cities and towns, but only by general laws which apply alike to all cities, or 
to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer than 
two. " 40 The Court concluded that the statute met the requirements of sec-
tion 8 because it applied to a facility for a county, which represents a class 
of two or more towns and cities. 41 The Court stated also that the special 
legislation was valid because the statute provides that the county commis-
sioners may take or purchase "any land and buildings that may be necessary 
for said purposes," without specifying the land of any particular city or 
town. 42 
The Court stressed that the issue in this case was one of legislative intent, 
and not of town or county rights. 43 In addition to concluding that the 
Legislature did not intend the Zoning Act to subject state buildings to local 
zoning regulations, the Court also expressed concern with maintaining con-
sistency within the legislative framework stating that a requirement of ex-
press legislative intent would cause undue confusion in other situations in 
" 363 Mass. 136, 293 N.E.2d 268 (1973). /d. at 155-56, 293 N.E.2d at 280 . 
.. /d. 
" /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1290, 405 N.E.2d at 642 (emphasis supplied by the Court). 
" /d. 
40 Art. 2 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 89 of 
the Amendments, § 8. 
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which the Legislature did not intend to yield to local regulations but did not 
specifically refer to them in the statute. 44 
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Wilkins argued that the Home Rule Amend-
ment should have changed this presumption about silence on the part of the 
Legislature. He claimed that the Court did a disservice to the spirit and pro-
visions of this amendment by relying on decisions made prior to its passage 
in attributing to the legislature an intention to override local ordinances 
when a statute is silent on the issue. 45 While agreeing that the Legislature 
clearly could have authorized the County Commissioners to proceed in 
disregard of local regulations and acknowledging that the proposed use 
would not be incompatible with other uses authorized by the town's by-law, 
he strongly disagreed with "the principle established by the court's decision 
. . . that every grant of the power of eminent domain to a State entity or 
agency [at least if enacted after the Home Rule Amendment] contains an 
implied right to disregard explicit, lawful, local restrictions. " 46 He con-
tended that, in light of the Home Rule Amendment, it would be better to re-
quire that the Legislature be specific on the issue of overriding local legisla-
tion. 47 
Although the Bristol County Commissioners decision produced a 
satisfactory result, the approaches of both the majority and minority to the 
issue are, it seems, overly automatic. Ideally, the Legislature should try to 
avoid this type of conflict by providing specific statements of its intent. Bar-
ring this, however, a balancing test that would examine whether the govern-
mental entity's need serves a greater or more important purpose than that of 
the local regulation might achieve consistently fairer results. For example, 
one might have asked whether the horses in Teasdale v. Newell & Snowling 
Construction Co. 41 really needed to be stabled in Quincy in contravention 
of the local health laws or, in the present case, whether the jail actually con-
flicts with local zoning regulations in any meaningful way. With such a 
balancing test, an outcome would be determined by the importance of the 
objective, and not simply according to which is the dominant level of gov-
ernment. 
§ 10.7. Special Permits-Board Denial Overturned. In the 1962 case 
of Mahoney v. Board of Appeals of Winchester; the Supreme Judicial 
Court extended the doctrine of Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barn-
stable, 2 which grants deference to the discretion of a local board in denying a 
•• /d. 
•• ld. at 1301, 405 N.E.2d at 643 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
•• ld., 405 N.E.2d at 644 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
47 /d. (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
•• See text at note 15 supra. 
§ 10.7. ' 344 Mass. 598, 183 N.E.2d 850 (1962). 
• 331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916 (1954); see Sacks and Curran, Administrative Law, 1954 
ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW, § 14.25. 
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variance or special permit. 3 According to this doctrine, the judge may over-
rule the board's decision only when the variance or permit was denied on a 
legally untenable ground, except for which the variance or permit would 
have been granted, or when the denial was "unreasonable, whimsical, 
capricious, or arbitrary and so illegal. " 4 While this policy that the reviewing 
court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the local board re-
mains strong, 5 the rule's stated exceptions will be applied, as illustrated by a 
1980 case in which the board's denial of a special permit was overturned. 
In McDonald's Corporation v. Board of Selectmen of Randolph, 6 the 
Appeals Court upheld the superior court's determination that the town's 
board of selectmen had been arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable in de-
nying the plaintiff a common victualler's license for a proposed restaurant 
in a shopping center. 7 Although the board had not stated any reason for its 
denial or kept any record of its proceeding that was appropriate for review, 
it brought forth three reasons for denying the permit in the superior court. • 
The board maintained that, according to its interpretation of the by-law's 
parking regulations, McDonald's could not provide sufficient parking for 
the facility. 9 The board also claimed that the restaurant would increase traf-
fic, endangering students from the nearby high school who would patronize 
it. 1° Finally, the board stated that appropriate plans showing the 
restaurant's interior layout had not been filed, as required by chapter 140, 
section 6 of the General Laws. ll 
The Appeals Court quickly dismissed the board's claim that the area 
leased by the restaurant in the shopping center was a separate lot requiring 
sufficient parking space on the lot itself for the restaurant's patrons. The 
court found that the plaintiff's lease with the shopping center provided the 
' See Huber, Land Use and Planning Law, 1962 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW,§ 13.6 
• 331 Mass. at 559-60, 120 N.E.2d at 919. 
' See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1979 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW,§ 15.7. 
' 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 97, 399 N.E.2d 38. 
' /d. at 99, 399 N.E.2d at 41. 
' /d. at 98, 399 N.E.2d at 40 . 
• /d. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. G.L. c. 140, § 6, provides in pertinent part that 
/d. 
"[a] common victualler's ... license may be issued to an applicant therefor if at the 
time of his application he has upon his premises the necessary implements and facilities 
for cooking, preparing and serving food for strangers and travelers .... An applicant 
for a license as a common victualler ... , proposed to be exercised upon premises which 
have not been equipped with fixtures or supplied with necessary implements and 
facilities for cooking, preparing and serving food . . . shall file with the licensing 
authorities a plan showing the location of counters, tables, ranges, toilets and in general 
the proposed set-up of the premises ... which he proposes to have upon said premises if 
and when the license may issue, together with an itemized estimate of the cost of said 
proposed set-up and of such fixtures, and of the implements and facilities necessary for 
cooking, preparing and serving food .... " 
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restaurant with rights to the common parking facilities of the center that 
were adequate for its parking needs. 12 This arrangement would satisfy the 
applicable section of the town by-law covering parking requirements for 
joint facilities. 13 
The court also rejected the town's second claim, finding that the evidence 
amply supported the trial judge's conclusion that the proposed facility 
would not have a detrimental impact on traffic in the area and would create 
a safety hazard for the high school students. 14 The center itself had been 
built with knowledge of the proximity of the high school, fire station, and 
other public facilities. 15 One of the two original lead stores, which had since 
left the center, drew heavier traffic than was presently using the access road 
and had contained a separate restaurant licensed by the board. 1' The re-
maining lead store had an eating establishment, and the center also con-
tained a separate licensed restaurant. 17 A Burger King was on the same road 
only 900 feet from the high school. 11. In addition, the site for the restaurant 
was in a relatively empty spot in the shopping center,., and the restaurant's 
peak hours would not coincide with the arrival or departure of the high 
school buses, periods that were covered by police and traffic duty. zo The 
court found it significant that traffic signals near the school had been ap-
proved six years before the plaintiff's application but were never installed21 
and noted that the accident rate in the vicinity was "low to average," con-
sisting primarily of minor property damage. zz Finally, the fact that the 
center was not located near a major highway indicated that it would not at-
tract additional outside traffic, but would only serve those already in the 
area. 23 
The court also determined that the trial judge was justified in impliedly 
denying the board's claim that the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of 
chapter 140, section 6. 24 Even though there was little evidence in the record, 
the court concluded that adequate compliance could have been satisfied by 
plans submitted at the board's initial hearing or through information con-
veyed to the board by other departments involved in the plaintiff's pro-
posal.z' 











23 Id., 399 N.E.2d at 41. 
24 Id . 
., /d. 
31
Huber: Chapter 10: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
420 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §10.7 
While acknowledging that a local board, in its capacity as a licensing 
authority, has considerable discretion in performing this function and that a 
judge may not substitute his judgment for the board's, 26 the court em-
phasized that certain standards of decisionmaking must be met: "A board 
which has power to grant or withhold a permit must decide 'in a fair, 
judicial and reasonable manner upon the evidence as presented ... keeping 
in mind the objects of the applicable regulation.' " 2 ' The court also noted 
that an unsuccessful applicant for a common victualler's license can prevail 
when it can be shown that, in refusing to grant the license, the licensing 
authority has "proceeded upon grounds erroneous in law or [has] otherwise 
violated legal rights of the [applicant]. " 28 
Although the court found that the superior court judge had correctly con-
cluded that the board's reasons for denying the permit did not satisfy these 
standards, it ruled that the judge had improperly ordered the license to issue 
rather than remanding the matter to the board for further proceedings. 29 
Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and entered a new judgment an-
nulling the board's decision and directing the board to hold further pro-
ceedings necessary for reconsideration of the plaintiff's application in light 
of the opinion. 30 The court added that such reconsideration could include a 
request by the board for an update of the plans required by chapter 140, sec-
tion 6. 31 
In another special permit case, Garvey v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 32 
the Appeals Court found that the local board of appeals had not acted in ex-
cess of its authority in granting a special permit and reversed the decision of 
the superior court invalidating the permit. 33 The permit allowed the defend-
ant applicant to use a lot in a residentially zoned district as a parking area 
for a maximum of fourteen cars. 34 One of the conditions imposed on the 
permit was that it would terminate if the defendant's nearby lot, zoned for 
commercial use, ceased to be used for a commercial purpose. 35 Several 
homeowners appealed to the superior court, which invalidated the permit 
on the grounds that the board's decision would allow the introduction of a 
non-residential use into a residential area. 36 The only question raised on ap-
" /d. 
" /d. (citing Board of Health of Woburn v. Sousa, 338 Mass. 547, 553, 156 N.E.2d 52, 57 
(1959)). 
21 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 99, 399 N.E.2d at 41 (citing Liggett Drug Co. v. License 
Commissioners of N. Adams, 296 Mass. 41, 44, 4 N.E.2d 628, 631 (1936)). 
29 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 99-100, 399 N.E.2d at 41. 
•• /d. at 100, 399 N.E.2d at 41. 
" /d. 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 415, 400 N.E.2d at 880. 
" ld., 400 N.E.2d at 881. 
•• /d. 
" /d . 
.. ld. 
32
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peal was the board's authority to grant the permit, not the adequacy of the 
board's findings. 37 
The Appeals Court outlined the limitations of the role of the reviewing 
court in examining the decision of the local board of appeals. The trial 
judge must hear the matter de novo and determine the legal validity of the 
board's decision on the basis of his fact-finding. 38 The board's granting of a 
permit must be upheld if it is for a use that is "in harmony with the general 
purpose and intent of the ordinance or by-law, " 39 and the decision does not 
rest on "a legally untenable ground" 40 and is not unreasonable, whimsical 
or arbitrary. 41 The court emphasized that "[a] court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the board. " 42 
Because the Amherst zoning by-law specifically authorizes the issuance of 
a special permit for a commercial parking lot in a residentially zoned area 
when the board finds that specified standards have been met, the court con-
cluded that the board could not be found to have acted beyond its authority 
when it determined that those standards were met. 43 Likewise, the decision 
was not the result of whim or caprice and did not permit a use not contem-
plated by the by-law, which the court understood to be the trial judge's rul-
ing. 44 The court, therefore, entered a new judgment that the board did not 
exceed its authority and that the board's decision was affirmed. 45 
Special permits are specifically provided for in the Zoning Act46 and in 
ordinances and should not, therefore, be considered extraordinary depar-
tures from a zoning scheme. While the court continues its Pendergast policy 
in protecting the legitimate discretionary powers of the local board, it also 
will react against attempts by either the board or reviewing court to deny 
permits on invalid grounds. 
§ 10.8. Variance-Substantial Derogation Criterion. Local planning 
boards may grant variances from zoning by-laws only if certain statutory re-
quirements are met. 1 These requirements include, inter alia, that there be no 
substantial departure from the intent and purpose of the Zoning Enabling 
Act. In Cavanaugh v. DiF/umera, 2 the Appeals Court reversed a trial 
37 /d. 
" /d. 
" /d. (quoting from G.L. c. 40A, § 9, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 808, § 3). 
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 415, 400 N.E.2d at 881, (citing Caruso v. Pastan, 1 
Mass. App. 28, 29, 294 N.E.2d 501, 502 (1973)). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 415, 400 N.E.2d at 881. 
" /d. 
" /d . 
.. /d. 
" /d. at 416, 400 N.E.2d at 882. 
" G.L. c. 40A, § 9. 
§ 10.8. 1 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (2d ed. 1977), § 18.08. 
' 1980 Mass. App, Ct. Adv. Sh. 535, 401 N.E.2d 867. 
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court's annulment of a variance granted by the Agawam Planning Board. 3 
In finding that the planning board had properly granted the variance, the 
court explained that which would comport with the mandates of the Zoning 
Enabling Act. 4 
In Cavanaugh, the owners of the land in question had purchased the land 
and building in order to operate a general store.' The building had been 
constructed in the 1920's as a commercial garage, before zoning had been 
instituted in Agawam. 6 Following its use as a commercial garage, the struc-
ture was used for various commercial purposes. Each structure was 
operated under variations of the zoning law. The most recent of those 
variances was one granted in 1967 to allow the owners to operate a general 
store.' In 1974, a subsequent owner of the property was denied permission 
to use the building for offices, on the basis that this variance for a general 
store was still in effect. • 
When the present owners bought the premises in 1976, intending to use it 
as a general store, they received assurances from the building inspector and 
the town records that the lot did, in fact, have a variance for that purpose. 9 
The plaintiffs spent considerable funds renovating the building, which had 
become deteriorated and rat-infested! 0 In 1977, the abutting neighbor in-
' Id. at 541, 401 N.E.2d at 871. 
• This case was decided under the former Zoning Enabling Act because the new Zoning Act 
did not take effect in Agawam until 1978. The provisions of section 15 of the former Zoning 
Enabling Act outline the power of the board of appeals 
"[t]o authorize upon appeal, or upon petition in cases where a particular use is sought 
for which no permit is required, with respect to a particular parcel of land or to an ex-
isting building thereon a variance from the terms of the applicable zoning ordinance or 
by-law where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel or such building but 
not affecting generally the zoning district in which it is located, a literal enforcement of 
the provisions of the ordinance or by-law would involve substantial hardship, financial 
or otherwise to the appellant, and where desirable relief may be granted without 
substantial detriment to the public good and without nullifying or substantially 
derogating from the intent or purpose of such ordinance or by-law, but not otherwise." 
The corresponding section of the new Zoning Act, G.L. c. 40A, § 10, as amended by St. 1975, 
c. 808, retains these requirements, which remain essentially unchanged, but adds an additional 
conjunctive requirement that the circumstances creating the hardship relate to the soil condi-
tions, shape, or topography of the land or structure. In the present case, it is likely that the 
restricted frontage of the land would meet this requirement. Another provision added to this 
section requires that, in order for a use variance to be granted, the town must expressly allow 
such variances in its ordinance. The applicability of this requirement to the present case would 
depend on the specific provisions of the Agawam ordinance. See Huber, Zoning and Land 
Use, 1976 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAw§ 15.6, for a discussion of the substantive changes in the 
new variance-granting provisions. 
' 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 537, 401 N.E.2d at 869. 
' Id. at 537, 401 N.E.2d at 869. 
1 /d . 
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itiated an action to enforce the provisions of the zoning by-law and revoke 
the owners' building permit. 11 She was granted relief on the basis that the 
supposed "variances" granted to the owners' predecessors were, instead, 
permits to continue nonconforming uses, which had now been eliminated 
by abandonment. 12 The owners appealed this ruling and, while the appeal 
was pending, applied for a variance. 13 When the variance was granted, they 
dropped their appeal. 14 The neighbor then challenged the variance, and the 
trial judge annulled the variance on the sole ground that it derogated from 
the intent and purpose of the zoning by-law!' The owners appealed that 
decision. 
The Appeals Court noted that the trial judge's findings clearly supported 
a determination that the plaintiffs met the statutory requirements that the 
circumstances especially affect the land, involve substantial hardship, and 
pose no detriment to the public good. 16 The land had restricted frontage 
that precluded construction of any new building because of dimensional re-
quirementsY In sum, the judge determined that the site was unusable for 
any purpose under the ordinance without a variance. 18 
Further, the trial court also had found that the use granted by the 
variance not only would not constitute a detriment to the public good, but 
tharit would substantially benefit the district. 19 This benefit stemmed from 
improving a badly deteriorated building and providing a needed service for 
residents of planned low-income and handicapped housing. 20 In addition, 
its location on a major artery near a cemetery served to minimize its effect 
on the residential nature of the district. 21 The Appeals Court noted in con-
clusion that the judge's only basis for annulling the board's decision was his 
determination that the variance derogated from the intent and purpose of 
the by-law. 22 
In reversing the trial judge's decision, the Appeals Court noted that all of 
the findings that the judge applied to the issue of public detriment applied 
also to the derogation question. 23 The court emphasized that the deviation 
from the by-law must be substantial and that, barring a significant detrac-
tion from the zoning plan, the discretionary power of the local board must 
II /d. 
" Id. at 537-38, 401 N.E.2d at 869. 
" /d. at 538, 401 N.E.2d at 869. 
" /d. 
" Id. at 536, 401 N.E.2d at 868. 
" /d. at 535-36, 401 N.E.2d at 868. 
" /d. at 536-37, 401 N.E.2d at 869. 
" /d. at 537, 401 N.E.2d at 869. 
" Id. at 538, 401 N.E.2d at 869-70. 
20 /d. 
21 /d., 401 N.E.2d at 870. 
" /d. at 536, 401 N.E.2d at 868. 
" Id. at 538, 401 N.E.2d at 870. 
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be upheld. 24 The court pointed out that every variance, by definition, in-
volves some derogation from the by-law. 25 Thus, the court stated, a finding 
of a substantial deviation must be found before the board approval could be 
annulled. 26 
The court pointed to a number of facts established by the trial judge that 
supported a determination that this use would not be in conflict with the in-
tent and purpose of the by-law. These included more attractive use, benefit 
to the district, the history of nonconforming uses at the site, an already 
heterogeneous neighborhood, the existence of a town by-law that allows 
business use, the relative isolation of the site, and the restrictions that were 
imposed on the variance to limit its effect. 27 The court also noted that the 
only person in the area that could be injured by the variance was the 
plaintiff-neighbor and found that this was mitigated by the existence of 
commercial uses at the site for 30 years. 28 
The court also considered important what it termed the "exceptional cir-
cumstances" arising from the history of the case, in which the owners relied 
in good faith upon prior zoning decisions regarding the land that had been 
declared invalid retroactively. 29 Additionally, the court pointed out that the 
owners' withdrawal of their appeal of that decision was undoubtedly 
predicated upon their obtaining of the variance. 30 Although it emphasized 
the above unique circumstances, the court also noted that the facts in the 
case were parallel to numerous other decisions in which variances were 
upheld because the land could not be developed for any use permitted by the 
ordinance. 31 
While affirming the necessity that all the requirements of the enabling act 
be met in the grant of a variance, this decision also emphasizes the fact that 
variances should not be viewed as extraordinary departures from the zoning 
plan. They are "safety valves" from the strict requirements of a plan that 
are specifically provided for in the statute. Once an applicant has met the 
more difficult requirements of showing unique circumstances and substan-
tial hardship and proving that the use will not be a detriment to the public 
good, he or she cannot be denied a variance granted by the discretion of the 
local board simply because the use deviates in some minor way from the or-
dinance, for that is the very idea behind a variance. 
" !d. at 539, 401 N.E.2d at 870. 
" /d. 
26 Id. at 539, 401 N.E.2d at 870. 
" /d. at 539-41, 401 N.E.2d at 870-71. 
11 /d. at 540, 401 N.E.2d at 871. 
"/d. 
•• !d. at 538, 401 N.E.2d at 869. 
" /d. at 541, 401 N.E.2d at 871. 
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§ 10.9. Interpretation of Local By-Law. During the Survey year, in 
Farmer v. Town of Billerica, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held invalid a 
local building inspector's interpretation of the term ''buffer zone'' in a local 
zoning ordinance. 2 The building inspector's interpretation of the term 
precluded any improvement of the land or any use of the land. 3 The Court 
determined that this interpretation amounted to an illegal confiscation of 
the land. 4 
The zoning ordinance in question, which was passed by the town of 
Billerica in 1979, changed the zoning of the plaintiffs' land from a residen-
tial district to a "buffer zone." s Land adjoining the plaintiffs' land was 
rezoned by the same ordinance to become a "general business district. " 6 In 
1979, the Billerica building inspector interpreted ordinance as requiring that 
the "buffer zone" must remain unbuilt and unused for any purpose. 7 The 
land court held this interpretation valid. 8 The plaintiffs appealed to the 
Supreme Judicial Court, claiming that the land court's ruling was "con-
fiscatory and unreasonable. " 9 
The Attorney General also filed a brief with the Supreme Judicial Court 
as amicus curiae. 10 The Attorney General argued that the town should have 
taken the land by eminent domain if it wanted to preclude all possible 
uses. 11 
The Court held that the zoning ordinance could not be interpreted to 
preclude all uses of the plaintiffs' land. 12 The Court noted that the town 
meeting's warrant for the zoning ordinance that created the "buffer zone" 
had not intended "to impose zoning requirements stricter than those then 
existing." 13 Consequently, the Court refused to construe the "ambiguous 
reference" to a "buffer zone" as an attempt to exceed the town meeting's 
authority under the warrant article. 14 Rather, the Court interpreted "buffer 
§ 10.9. 1 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1957, 409 N.E.2d 762. 
' /d. at 1958, 409 N.E.2d at 763. 
'/d . 
• /d. 
' /d. at 1957, 409 N.E.2d at 763. 
6 /d. 
7 /d . 
• /d. 
' /d., 409 N.E.2d at 762. 
1• !d., 409 N.E.2d at 763. 
11 /d. The Attorney General also contended that the plaintiffs' failure to object immediately 
to the rezoning did not help the town's case. /d. (citing Barney & Carey Co. v. Milton, 324 
Mass. 440, 445 (1949)). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1957, 409 N.E.2d at 763. The Court noted that the building in-
spector's interpretation of the ordinance would preclude the plaintiffs' even from building a 
fence. /d. 
" /d. at 1957, 409 N.E.2d at 763. 
" /d. 
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zone" to exempt the plaintiffs' land from the contemporaneous rezoning of 
the adjoining land into a business district.•' Because the plaintiffs' land had 
been zoned as residential when the ordinance was passed, the Court con-
cluded that the land was to remain zoned for residential uses. 16 The Court 
construed the ordinance in this manner to avoid considering its illegality 
and possible unconstitutionality. •' 
The Farmer case serves as a reminder of the potential consequences of 
hasty or imprecise draftsmanship in local ordinances. Although these or-
dinances are drafted often in the heat of town meetings, the ordinances 
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